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The Impact of Income 
Inequality on  Economic 
Growth 
 
Increases in income inequality have both growth-promoting effects 
(stronger performance incentives, as well as incentives to invest in 
one’s own human capital, to take risks, and to make investments) and 
growth-dampening effects (demotivating incentives, social tensions 
and political unrest, declines in demand as a brake on growth). While 
increases in income inequality in the 1950s and the 1960s still led to 
growth-promoting effects, current studies increasingly identify 
growth-dampening effects. Particularly in highly developed economies 
such as Germany, Japan and the United States, these studies indicate 
that increasing income inequality has reached a level that is becoming 
a brake on growth. For this reason, there is no fundamental 
contradiction between state-led income redistribution and economic 
growth. The reduction of income inequality should not be limited to a 
pure redistribution through the tax-transfer system, but should also 
include a rebalancing of the supply-side policies of the past 30 years.  
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1.  Growth effects of income inequality according to 
theory 
The influence of income inequality on the development of real gross domestic product 
is transmitted through a number of mechanisms, and is not unambiguous. An in-
crease in income inequality can have both growth-promoting and growth-dampening 
effects (see Fig. 1). 
The question of which of these effects are predominant depends strongly on the de-
gree of income inequality already reached.  
• If the total societal income is perfectly equal (QA in Fig. 2), there is little incentive 
for an intensification of work effort. With an increase in income inequality, it can 
be expected that growth-promoting incentives predominate, and that the gross 
domestic product (GDP) increases.  
• However, if income is very unequally distributed – in the most extreme case, only 
a single person has all the income, while the income of all other members of soci-
ety is equal to zero (QC in Fig. 2) – people have no great incentive to work. In this 
case, an increase in gross domestic product can be expected from a reduction in 
income inequality.  
• As a result, it can thus be assumed that the relationship between economic growth 
– measured on the basis of real gross domestic product – and the degree of income 
inequality assumes an inverted-U trajectory, and that an optimal level of income 
inequality can be found simply though consideration of the prevailing GDP level. 
This trajectory can be found, for example, in Knell 1998: 466, Cornia et al 2004, 
and Cornia and Court 2001: 24.  
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2. Empirical growth effects of income inequality 
The forgoing shows that the relationship between the degree of income inequality 
and economic growth is not linear. As a consequence, empirical studies produce very 
different results.  
• For a long time, it was considered to be relatively certain that the increase of in-
come inequality had a growth-promoting effect, through production of the above-
noted incentives. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, it was believed that income 
inequality, thanks to the higher savings propensity of high-income persons, leads 
to higher investment levels, and thus has a positive effect on economic growth 
(see Benhabib 2003: 329). Looking at 45 countries across the 1966 – 1995 time 
period, for example, Forbes calculated a positive relationship between a country’s 
degree of income inequality and its economic growth (see Forbes 2000: 885).  
• However, even by the 1990s, there were also empirical studies that offered a con-
trary assessment. For example, using his own and others’ empirical studies as a 
basis, Knell examined the relationship between the per capita GDP growth rate 
and income distribution as measured by the Gini coefficient, finding that for the 
period between 1960 and 1985, an increase in the Gini coefficient by 10 percent-
age points reduced the long-term annual growth rate by 0.3% to 0.6% (Knell 1998: 
449). 
• In an examination of the influence of income inequality on per capita GDP in 46 
countries in the period from 1970 to 1995, Herzer and Vollmer also come to the 
conclusion that an increase in income inequality has a negative influence on GDP 
growth. This result is independent of whether the country under consideration is 
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a developed economy or a developing country. It is also independent of whether 
the country is democratic or non-democratic (see Herzer and Vollmer 2012: 489, 
501). However, in their review of the literature, the two note a number of studies 
in which the relationship between income inequality and economic growth is pos-
itive (see Herzer and Vollmer 2012: 490–492).  
• In his analysis of 84 countries between 1965 and 1995, Barro finds no relation-
ship between income inequality and economic inequality. The results change with 
a division of the full country sample into rich and poor economies: for poor coun-
tries (those with a real per capita GDP of less than $2,070, measured in 1985 
dollars), a negative relationship between income inequality and economic growth 
is calculated, while a positive relationship emerges for rich economies (see Barro 
2000).  
• In an International Monetary Fund discussion paper, Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides 
indicate in the context of an overview of current work on this topic that most 
empirical studies show income inequality to have a growth-dampening effect. 
Their own calculations (173 countries, over a time period of 1960 to 2010) also 
show a negative relationship between income inequality and economic growth. 
Nevertheless, they also note that there are indeed studies that come to a contrary 
conclusion (see Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides 2014: 8 f., 17; also Benhabib 2003: 
329 f.). 
• Negative effects associated with increasing income inequality are shown by an 
OECD study (Cingano 2014), an August 2014 Standard & Poor’s study, as well as 
an earlier IMF study (Berg and Ostry 2011a), among others. Further evidence of 
growth-dampening effects can be found in United Nations studies and reports 
(United Nations 2013: 63–65; United Nations Development Programme 2013: 
Chapter Two). 
This ambivalent picture is compatible with the relationships depicted in Fig. 2, and 
can be simplistically explained as follows: If a positive relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth is found for a country or group of countries, it sug-
gests that the level of income inequality lies between the values IImin and II* (Fig. 2). 
In the case of a negative relationship between these two factors, the level of income 
inequality by contrast lies between II* and IImax. And if the group of countries con-
sidered contains economies whose income inequality lies in both areas, it is possible 
that no statistical correlation at all between income inequality and economic growth 
will be found.  
There is no clear empirical evidence regarding the question of when the growth-pro-
moting and growth-dampening effects shift direction. In their calculations, using data 
from 73 countries, Cornia et al. come to the following conclusions: Up to a Gini-coef-
ficient value of 0.3, an increase in income inequality has a growth-promoting effect. 
At a Gini-coefficient value of 0.45 and above, however, an increase in income ine-
quality has a growth-dampening effect (see United Nations Development Programme 
2013: 51). In a 2001 policy brief, Cornia and Court come to the conclusion that a Gini 
coefficient value between 0.25 and 0.4 has a growth-promoting effect (see Cornia and 
Court 2001: 24). By contrast, a calculation by the Korea Institute for International 
Economic Policy (KIEP), encompassing 77 countries between the period of 1980 and 
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2007, arrives at a substantially lower value for the point at which the growth-damp-
ening effects of income inequality begin to predominate. According to these esti-
mates, the change-over point lies at a Gini-coefficient value of 0.245 (see Cho, Kim 
and Rhee 2014: 10, 17).   
Ultimately, these findings suggest that income inequality has a negative effect on 
economic growth at least from a Gini coefficient value of 0.45 (see Standard & Poor’s 
2014: 19). However, it should be noted that this is an average value derived from 
data of countries at different levels of economic development. There is some evidence 
that the threshold of income inequality at which the growth-promoting effects give 
way to growth-dampening effects depends on the economy’s economic-development 
status. We address this issue in the following section. 
 
3. Long-term effects of income inequality on the 
growth trajectory 
The discussion above refers primarily to a comparative static analysis – that is, to the 
comparison of various degrees of income inequality to the level of GDP in a number 
of countries at a given time. The following addresses the possible long-term effects 
of a high degree of income equality on an economy’s growth potential. Effects im-
pacting both the supply and demand sides of GDP are considered here, along with 
the resulting interactions.  
• On the supply side, a high level of income equality can weaken an economy’s 
production potential, particularly with regard to human capital. If citizens have 
the feeling that vigorous effort will not pay off, because the largest share of the 
national income accrues to a small part of the population in any case, then invest-
ments in their own human capital in the form of education are not worthwhile. 
However, a qualitative improvement in human capital is a key prerequisite for 
economic growth. High levels of income inequality become particularly serious 
when citizens’ dissatisfaction is broad enough that they leave their country. From 
an empirical perspective, young and well-qualified people have the highest degree 
of cross-border mobility; consequently, this effect threatens the society with a 
brain drain that reduces the potential for growth. The weakening of human capital 
as a reaction to a high and rising income inequality in this way reduces an econ-
omy’s long-term growth potential (see Bernstein 2013: 6). A high level of income 
inequality can also impair an economy’s human capital insofar as low-income 
people do not have sufficient access to the health care system. Overall, a lack of 
investment in education and health care lead by this means to a slowdown in 
human-capital formation, which then also slows economic growth (see Baur, Co-
lombier and Daguet 2015: 11).  
• Another supply-side growth weakness can arise when a high level of income con-
centration additionally leads to a situation in which this economic power is used 
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to exert political influence. In this regard, it can be expected that high-income 
people advocate a reduction in taxes. The associated declines in state revenues 
have the consequence that the state must reduce its expenditure on investments 
such as infrastructure and education. The resulting undersupply of public ser-
vices weakens the society’s productive apparatus, thus dampening economic 
growth (through a lack of public infrastructure and low productivity as a conse-
quence of low education expenditures; see Bernstein 2013: 6).  
• Finally, a high degree of inequality of market incomes can additionally lead to a 
situation in which extensive state redistribution of income becomes necessary. 
This requires a high level of state revenue. Growing income inequality in this 
regard necessitates tax increases or an expanded public debt. Tax increases re-
duce the performance incentives for taxpayers, and can lead to capital flight. This 
results in lower volumes of investment, and thus diminished growth in the econ-
omy’s capital stock, as well as a lower level of economic growth. The same effect 
appears if a high level of state borrowing raises interest rates and thus suppresses 
private investment (Keynes’ so-called crowding-out effect; see Petersen 2013: 86–
87).  
• On the demand side, a high degree of income inequality weakens the demand for 
goods and services. If, under a condition of high income inequality, a steadily in-
creasing share of income goes to high-income households, the consequent savings 
will lead to a drop in demand, because the consumption ratio (defined as con-
sumption expenditure as a share of disposable income) of those people with rising 
disposable net incomes declines. This relationship is depicted in Fig. 3, using Ger-
many as an example. 
 
 
In less developed economies, these savings are available for investment – that is, the 
drop in consumer demand is offset through business investment. In highly developed 
economies, however, the level of capital stock is already very high. If there is then a 
decline in consumer demand, there is no incentive for additional investment. Conse-
quently, investment does not compensate for the shortfall in consumer demand. This 
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relationship can also be illustrated using Germany as an example: There, the down-
ward trend in consumer demand and the resulting decline in net investment have in 
sum resulted in an excess supply of savings. This has been true of Germany since 
about 2002, and also applied to the former West Germany in the middle to late 1980s 
(see Fig. 4). An oversupply of savings of this kind corresponds to weak consumption 
of domestically produced goods and services. However, if domestic businesses find 
that not all their produced goods and services are demanded, this reduces the incen-
tive to increase production capabilities through further investment. Consequently, 
investment declines as a result of the weak domestic demand for goods. Thus growth 
in the economy’s overall capital stock also weakens, along with long-term growth 
potential. In the medium term, this trend leads to stagnation or even economic con-
traction. 
Countries such as Germany and Japan are currently counteracting this fundamental 
tendency toward stagnation primarily through export surpluses (the German finan-
cial surplus in Fig. 4, or net external lending/borrowing, corresponds to a German 
current-account surplus). However, this is not a sustainable solution, because if all 
developed economies pursued this strategy, a serious question arises with regard to 
who could receive the export surpluses. 
As a result, it can be stated that a high or increasing level of income inequality damp-
ens future economic growth, weakening both the supply side (human capital and real 
capital) and the demand side. 
08 
 
 
F
u
tu
re
 S
o
ci
a
l 
M
a
rk
e
t 
E
co
n
o
m
y
 I
m
p
u
ls
e
 #
 2
0
1
5
/0
5
 
The question of when this weakening – particularly the lack of demand for goods – 
leads to stagnation, in our opinion depends largely on the economy’s GDP level.  
• In less developed economies with a relatively small overall capital stock, a decline 
in consumer demand can be compensated for by companies’ investment needs – 
thus, a stagnation with roots on the demand side is not a serious risk.  
• In highly developed economies with a relatively large overall capital stock, a de-
cline in consumer demand can no longer be compensated for through companies’ 
investment needs. If the high savings rate then occurs in an aging and shrinking 
society such as Germany or Japan, there is a risk of demand-driven stagnation. 
Even in the United States, there is some evidence that the high degree of income 
inequality has reached the point at which growth-dampening effects have become 
predominant (as noted in the assessment by Standard & Poor’s 2014: 4). 
 
4. Assessment of the growth effects of income ine-
quality in Germany 
In light of the foregoing analysis and the literature, we conclude that the extent of 
income inequality in Germany has become a brake on growth, because the growth-
dampening effects are greater than the growth-promoting effects. The primary indi-
cator for this thesis is the fact that savings have exceeded net investment for a num-
ber of years.   
There is support for this assessment in the literature. For example, Brenke and Wag-
ner are of the opinion that the unequal distribution of income has slowed economic 
growth in Germany since the early 2000s (see Brenke and Wagner 2013: 110). Cal-
culations by the OECD also indicate a growth-dampening effect associated with in-
come inequality in Germany. According to these calculations, the real per capita GDP 
in Germany grew by about 26 percent in Germany between 1990 and 2010. Had 
income inequality not increased during this period, the growth in real per capita GDP 
would have been six percentage points higher (see Cingano 2014: 18). 
 
5. Economic-policy implications 
Increases in income inequality, at a moderate level of income inequality, have a pos-
itive effect on economic growth. However, if a certain degree of income inequality is 
exceeded, income inequality has a negative impact on economic growth. The fact that 
a significant majority of recent studies conclude that an unequal distribution in the 
long run has perceptibly negative effects on economic growth (Baur, Colombier and 
Daguet 2015: 11) suggests that an increasing number of economies have reached a 
09 
 
 
 
F
u
tu
re
 S
o
ci
a
l 
M
a
rk
e
t 
E
co
n
o
m
y
 I
m
p
u
ls
e
 #
 2
0
1
5
/0
5
 
level of inequality at which the wealth-dampening effects of inequality have begun 
to predominate. In this case, there is no fundamental contradiction between a state 
redistribution of income and economic growth.  
Those designing any income redistribution policy, however, must bear in mind that 
the collection of state income can also have negative effects on economic growth, by 
reducing performance incentives for taxpayers (which affects labour and capital sup-
ply), and through the welfare and growth losses associated with tax collection (see 
Petersen 2010). In the specific design of state income-redistribution measures, it is 
therefore important to ensure that the negative growth effects of redistribution are 
not larger than the positive growth effects of the income redistribution (Berg and 
Ostry 2011a: 3, Berg and Ostry 2011b: 15). 
In this regard, a reduction in income inequality should not be limited solely to pure 
redistribution through the tax-transfer system. A realignment of the supply-side pol-
icies of the last 30 years is also necessary. In many developed nations, demand-ori-
ented economic policies were replaced in the late 1970s by a supply-side economics 
policy. At the heart of this economic policy orientation is an improvement in supply-
side conditions for businesses through cost and tax reductions, an increase in flexi-
bility within goods and labour markets, and the restriction of government activities 
to a few core tasks (see Adam 2014: 107). 
Within the framework of this economic policy orientation, a redistribution of income 
to favor income from business activities is not an undesirable side effect, but rather 
an intended consequence, as an improvement in companies’ income conditions is 
considered to be a prerequisite for increasing economic growth and creating new jobs 
(Adam 2104: 107). However, if the wealth-promoting effects of this income redistri-
bution are no longer evident, there is also no longer any economic justification for 
the resulting differences in income. A modified supply-side policy then becomes nec-
essary, in which a stronger and more capable state strengthens the forces of growth 
by expanding access to education, health care and other state infrastructural offer-
ings for people with low incomes. This assumes a stable revenue base, in order that 
the expansion of state offerings does not lead to an increase in public debt. 
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